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The overall rise in inequality in the USA since 1980 has been matched by a rise in in-
equality between places; local and regional development policies aimed at reversing this 
polarisation have seen limited success. We propose an explanation for the spatial polar-
isation of prosperity and the failure of the policies to remedy it. Our explanation is based 
on the interaction of monopoly power, agglomeration economies in technology clusters 
and the power of financial sector actors over non-financial firms—all phenomena char-
acteristic of the post-1980 economy. We review evidence for each of these elements and 
propose some causal relationships between them, as an outline of an ongoing research 
programme.
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Introduction
The paradox of our time is that we live with 
powerful technology accompanied by stag-
nating wages, increasing income inequality 
and a general malaise. While some choose to 
debate issues of measurement and magnitude, 
after Piketty and Saez (2003), it is impossible 
to ignore the preponderance of evidence that 
individuals and communities have not shared 
equally in economic prosperity over the past 
40 years. A small percentage of individuals are 
doing well, while the incomes of the vast ma-
jority of the population have stagnated.
This polarisation of income and opportunity 
has a distinct spatial dimension: corporate 
headquarters and good jobs have clustered 
in certain places, while other places are left 
behind. The spatial polarisation appears con-
nected with political polarisation. Regional 






/cjres/advance-article/doi/10.1093/cjres/rsaa024/6056183 by Birkbeck C
ollege, U
niversity of London user on 04 February 2021
Page 2 of 25
Feldman, Guy and Iammarino
reducing spatial inequality, often focus on pro-
moting innovation and entrepreneurship to en-
hance the performance of relatively deprived 
places or populations. The logic is that places 
that are able to successfully launch innovative 
companies will achieve some competitive ad-
vantage and capture new industries, with the 
opportunity for new jobs, building related local 
supply chains and wealth creation. Yet, over the 
past four decades, this model has not worked to 
create prosperity in most places.
We propose an explanation for the fre-
quent failure of local development policies. 
We consider three interrelated phenomena: 
the growing polarisation of income and oppor-
tunity between particular wealthy cities and 
other places left behind; the growth of market 
power of non-financial corporations; and the 
growing power of the financial sector, reflected 
in both its influence over non-financial firms 
and its share of total corporate profits. We con-
sider the US case where the growth of all three 
forces since roughly 1980 is well documented. 
We propose an understanding of how the three 
forces interact and reinforce one another as an 
outline for an ongoing research agenda and to 
encourage others to examine these issues.
The most pronounced growth in market power 
has been in sectors commonly called tech: Web-
based platform businesses, general-purpose 
software and businesses relying on strong in-
tellectual property protection, such as pharma-
ceuticals and biotech. These are also industries 
with the most pronounced propensity to cluster 
spatially, which standard theory attributes to 
agglomeration economies. Yet, in today’s tech 
markets, monopoly power and agglomeration 
economies reinforce one another. This gives 
tech agglomerations a gravitational pull for 
tech start-ups, an attraction that can seldom be 
matched by other places seeking to find their 
own niche in the tech world.
Growing firms need capital. Reforms to 
the regulation of pensions, corporate govern-
ance and the financial sector have enhanced 
the power of financial sector actors to redirect 
resources from firms that are less profitable to 
firms with higher earnings prospects; the pros-
pect of higher earnings is often based on the ex-
pectation of market power and monopoly rents. 
With a growing tech-monopoly sector, the less 
profitable firms operating in classically com-
petitive markets are stripped of assets or their 
cash flow is captured and redirected to higher 
return activities. Because the tech-monopoly 
firms are clustered in certain cities, the transfer 
of resources from less profitable firms to the 
monopoly sector has a distinct geographical 
bias. Thus, the gulf in opportunity separating 
tech clusters and left-behind places is driven 
not only by the power of the tech firms in the 
markets for their services, but also by the power 
of the financial sector. Growing market concen-
tration in banking and, with it, greater spatial 
concentration of banking further reinforce the 
spatial concentration of business growth.
The spatial concentration of prosperity is 
often understood as the product of new tech-
nologies and of the process of technological de-
velopment. We argue that it is, at least as much, 
the product of deregulation of finance and 
of network industries and of raising the legal 
threshold for abuse of market power. That this 
neoliberal agenda was enacted in the name of 
creating prosperity through entrepreneurship 
and competitive markets is an irony that we will 
not dwell on.
These elements—growing disparities be-
tween certain wealthy agglomerations, notably 
in tech and finance, and the rest; growing market 
power, most conspicuously that of platform 
companies such as Amazon and Google; and 
the enlargement of both the profitability and 
the influence of the financial sector—are all well 
documented. Each is also complex, and even 
more so when considered all together; here, we 
do not attempt to provide evidence for causal 
relationships. Our intention, rather, is to review 
evidence and to propose a certain set of relation-
ships as the basis for a future research agenda.
We begin, in the next section, by presenting 






/cjres/advance-article/doi/10.1093/cjres/rsaa024/6056183 by Birkbeck C
ollege, U
niversity of London user on 04 February 2021
Page 3 of 25
Regional disparities, monopoly and finance
distribution of income in the USA over the 
past 40  years. The section on ‘Monopoly’ dis-
cusses the growth of monopoly power, particu-
larly in relation to network economies, digital 
platforms and intellectual property rights. The 
section on ‘Marshallian externalities meet 
monopoly power’ lays out our understanding of 
the mutually reinforcing interactions between 
Marshallian agglomeration economies and 
technology-based monopoly. In the section on 
‘What harm does monopoly do?’, we consider 
ways in which such techno-monopoly clusters 
hold back the development of places outside 
the clusters and offer no comfort to many of 
their own residents outside the charmed tech 
sector. The growth of financial influence, the 
increased market and spatial concentration of 
the banking sector and the role played by fi-
nance in spatial polarisation of prosperity are 
discussed in the section on ‘Finance: feeding 
monopoly, holding others back’. The section on 
‘Implications and conclusions’ concludes with 
suggestions for further inquiry. 
The changing geography of 
prosperity
To capture disparities between incomes of dif-
ferent places, we follow Reeves’ (2017) focus 
on the top 20% of earners. In Reeves’ account, 
this group has done relatively well due to 
skill-biased technological change. Geography 
is absent from Reeves’ considerations, but his 
construct is useful in examining the changing 
geography of prosperity. Figure  1 shows the 
share of employed people with earnings above 
the 80th percentile, or the top 20% of the 
US earning distribution, in 1980 (Figure  1a), 
2016 (Figure  1b) and the change from 1980 
to 2016 (Figure 1c). Data are shown for com-
muting zones, with map areas proportional to 
population.
In 1980, the highest concentration of well-
paid workers was in Gary, Indiana—a steel 
manufacturing centre just east of Chicago, 
followed by Detroit (car manufacturing) and 
Washington DC. In 2016, the highest concen-
tration of well-paid workers was in Washington 
DC, followed by San Francisco-San Jose, New 
York and Boston. Looking to the change in 
position from 1980 to 2016—each locality’s 
rise, or fall, in the share of workers earning 
more than the 80th percentile nationally—the 
big winners were Washington DC, Boston and 
San Francisco-San Jose, along with secondary 
hubs in banking (Charlotte, North Carolina) 
and technology (Seattle, Washington; Raleigh-
Durham-Chapel Hill, North Carolina; and 
Austin, Texas). Places in the middle of the 
country lost higher wage earners: most of the 
industrial heartland declined in relative terms, 
including yesterday’s technological leaders, 
such as Detroit and Rochester, NY (once the 
centre of imaging technology, home of Kodak 
and Xerox). Simply being a large city, seat of 
many large corporations and, one might think, 
doing well from agglomeration economies 
(Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998), is not enough: large 
metropolitan areas in both the sunbelt and the 
Midwest, places such as Houston, Los Angeles, 
Chicago and Atlanta have all grown in popula-
tion but not in their shares of better-paid jobs.
Some of the spatial concentration of better-
paid jobs might be put down to simple local-
isation economies, skill-biased technological 
change and the consequent emergence of 
specialised headquarters clusters (for example, 
Moretti, 2012). Yet, as we celebrate and en-
courage entrepreneurship, current technologies 
exhibit a winner take-all-dynamic, which cre-
ates monopoly power (for example, see Weitzel 
et al., 2006): notably, the current concentrations 
of high-paid jobs are located in places with 
headquarters of well-known firms that demon-
strate monopoly power. 
Monopoly
We live in a time of a resurgence of monopoly 
power. This is seen in both non-financial and 
financial sectors (see section Finance: feeding 
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Figure 1. Share of employees in a commuting zone with earnings above 80th percentile of national earnings distribution. (a) 1980. (b) 
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non-financial industries in the USA, cost-price 
markups1 have grown substantially since 1980 
(De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017; Eggertsson 
et al., 2018). A similar pattern is seen in other 
countries, although the US case is one of the 
more pronounced (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 
2018). The rise is evident across most sectors: 
Grullon et al. (2018) find that three-quarters of 
all US industries became more concentrated 
between 1997 and 2012—but the concentra-
tion is far greater in those which are more digi-
tally intensive (see Calligaris et al., 2018, using 
the index of digital intensiveness from Calvino 
et al., 2018). Moreover, the rise in mark-ups is 
found only in the top half of each sector, ranked 
by mark-ups, while the bottom half is essen-
tially unchanged (Calligaris et  al., 2018), con-
sistent with the view that market power today 
is exercised not by classic oligopolies but in 
winner-take-all games, the winners being what 
Autor et  al. (2020) call superstar firms. Hsieh 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2019) study industry con-
centration, rather than mark-up, in broad in-
dustry categories for the USA: they find sharply 
increased concentration in wholesale, retail and 
other services (but not in manufacturing or util-
ities). The increased concentration in banking 
has been even more dramatic, with the emer-
gence of national banking, replacing 50 distinct 
and more locally focussed state banking sys-
tems (Berger et  al., 1995). Currently, banking 
in the USA is dominated by a small handful 
of banks.
Among non-financial corporations, our 
interest is in information and communications 
technologies (ICT), particularly Web plat-
forms and general-purpose software and also 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals, biotech, digi-
tised entertainment and publishing that are 
heavily dependent on intellectual property 
protection. As a shorthand, we will call all of 
these sectors information-based, as in all rep-
licable code is the basis of increasing returns. 
All enjoy extremely low marginal production 
costs for a given product and thus economies 
of scale; companies adopt business models 
focussed on internalising the benefits of those 
scale economies.
Looming largest are the platforms: busi-
ness models based on linking two sides of a 
transaction parties—customer and supplier in 
Amazon’s ‘marketplace’, friends on Facebook 
and search on Google. The power now exer-
cised by platform business is widely recog-
nised: as Kenney and Zysman (2016, 62)  put 
it, “We are in the midst of a reorganization of 
our economy in which the platform owners 
are seemingly developing power that may be 
even more formidable than was that of the 
factory owners in the early industrial revolu-
tion”. Amazon takes its cut from all the small 
businesses that sell via its marketplace—and 
keeps the sales record and customer informa-
tion. Indeed, 21 large companies, with publicly 
traded shares, are generating 10% or more 
of their revenue from sales through Amazon 
(Kim, 2017).
Closely related to the platform models 
are businesses based on proprietary 
general-purpose software, such as Microsoft’s 
Office applications and the Windows operating 
system. We do not call these platform models 
as they are not two-sided—they are not linking 
customer and seller, for instance; like the plat-
forms, however, they are network businesses. 
That is to say, existing users benefit when the 
number of users rises (Evans, 2003; Gawer, 
2010; Rochet and Tirole, 2006): much of the 
value of Microsoft Office lies in the fact that its 
files can be read reliably by other Office users.
Sectors such as pharmaceuticals, biotech-
nology and digitised entertainment and 
publishing share some salient characteristics of 
the Web- and software-based business models: 
extremely low marginal cost and thus increasing 
returns. The model is based on establishing and 
enforcing intellectual property rights, which set 
up monopoly rights over a discovery or idea.
Putting all of these business models under the 
umbrella heading of monopoly risks confusion, 
because their behaviour is different. A pharma-
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may have a simple textbook monopoly rela-
tionship with customers and will be finding 
the profit-maximising price until the patent 
expires. Network businesses, because they be-
come more valuable to each customer as more 
customers are added, may have a particularly 
strong motivation to engage in price discrimin-
ation and to add new product lines/features to 
attract additional network users. Platforms—
those serving primarily as intermediaries be-
tween customer and supplier—have complex 
pricing problems to solve (see Rysman 2009, 
for a summary). A  network or platform busi-
ness may find it rational to lose money initially 
in order to establish market dominance—an 
issue considered by Khan (2017) with regard 
to the (failed) anti-trust case against Amazon. 
We see another example with Uber, which went 
public in 2020 with a market value of $70 billion 
in the face of an annual operating loss of $3 bil-
lion: investor decisions are not based on current 
or short term earnings but are betting on future 
monopoly profits given the company’s poten-
tial for market dominance.
The main models of monopoly and examples 
are provided in Table  1. Here, we include 
among information-based monopolies any 
business that is designed to make supra-normal 
profits from increasing returns (that is, low mar-
ginal cost) through either exclusive rights to the 
product (for example, a patent on a drug or a 
chip design) or the lock-in effects of a network 
product.
Monopoly power is reflected in a company’s 
market valuation. Autor et  al. (2020) argue 
that a set of superstar firms has higher mark-
ups and a lower share of labour in sales and 
value added. As superstar firms gain market 
share across a wide range of sectors, the ag-
gregate (sector-wide) labour share falls. 
Figure  2 shows market valuation (as a share 
of GDP) and employment for the eight largest 
non-financial, non-oil US-based companies in 
1976 and 2016, 40 years apart. As per the 2016 
Table 1. Monopoly models of the information age.
Interface standards to prevent the emergence of competing products
•  Microsoft: document formats & Windows APIs. Has prevented competing (often free) desktop applications & 
PC operating systems. Note that the threat is not copying Microsoft’s software—it is free communication with it!
•  Apple maintains similar control of its system (which is, ironically, built on top of the open-source operating 
system BSD Unix)
Sale to advertisers of personal information from search or social networks
•  Google & Facebook
•  Also, any social network (Twitter, Instagram…)—the others just aren’t as successful as the big two
Tollgates to network products
•  Google uses Android (built on open-source Linux) as gatekeeper for phone aps; Apple does the same for 
IPhone
•  Amazon: search, reviews and fulfilment
•  Academic publishing—Elsevier, Springer and Taylor & Francis. The network is the journal’s history & reputation.
•  Bookers: Trip Advisor, Booking.com, Airbnb, Expedia, Uber, …
Simple intellectual property
•  Pharma
•  Biotech—Monsanto’s seeds
•  Hollywood
Old fashioned networks, wired and wireless
•  Deregulation, privatisation and the advent of mobile have made telecoms and television networks into sources 
of some of the world’s great new fortunes
ICT-enhanced scale economies for brick-and-mortar businesses
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market valuations, shares of GDP are around 
five times higher while employment has fallen 
by about half. In 2016, seven of the eight com-
panies are based on a network model, with GE 
as the only non-network company. In 1976, 
just two of the eight, AT&T and IBM, were 
network companies—and these two were out-
liers in terms of market. The majority of the 
2016 cohort of top companies in terms of GDP 
share are network companies that have moved 
to platforms. Most remarkable is how employ-
ment has fallen, relative to market capitalisa-
tion, in 2016.
Of particular interest to us here is the geo-
graphical distribution of monopoly power and 
of its growth. A rough valuation of monopoly 
power is given by the ratio of market valuation 
to book value—an approximation to Tobin’s 
Q. For each travel to work area that was home 
to the headquarters of at least five non-financial 
firms in the Compustat dataset in both 1980 and 
2016, we calculate this ratio on an aggregate 
basis summing market valuation and assets 
across all firms in the area and then considering 
the change in that ratio between 1980 and 2016. 
The results are shown in Figure 3. We see large 
rises in the ratio of the technology-heavy cites 
of the west coast and northeast and—despite 
a substantial rise in the ratio for the USA in 
aggregate—declines in much of the industrial 
Midwest.
The causes of this remarkable growth in 
market power are complex and, of course, 
contested. Many industries—energy util-
ities, transportation, telecommunications and 
banking—were substantially deregulated, a 
process that started in the 1970s. The courts 
accepted a reinterpretation of the theoretical 
construct of competition, originating from 
the University of Chicago and, in particular, 
Robert Bork (1967), which made it more dif-
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power. Laws were passed forbidding Federal 
government purchasers from using their con-
siderable bargaining power to bring down the 
prices of pharmaceuticals (Engelberg, 2015). 
Intellectual property rights were applied to 
new categories (patents were extended to 
software—adding to existing copyright pro-
tection—and living organisms, for instance), 
secured globally through TRIPS and in many 
cases extended in length. 
And, of most central importance, applica-
tions of digital technology create processes 
that exhibit significant economies of scale and 
scope. We cannot say that, however, without 
this warning: a company’s (Amazon, say, or 
Google) success in internalising the inherent 
benefits of the technology to secure market 
power does not imply that monopoly is techno-
logically pre-ordained or somehow natural. 
The appropriation of monopoly rents may be 
aided by suitable technologies, but ultimately 
it depends on institutions, which are, in turn, 
dependent on political choice. As Philippon 
(2019) shows, recent decades have seen the 
US economy become broadly less competitive 
than the economies of the European Union, a 
fact that is certainly due to differences not in 
technology but in institutions.
Marshallian externalities meet 
monopoly power
In competitive markets, geographic concentra-
tions of economic activity can benefit from lo-
calised external increasing returns, also known 
as agglomeration economies. In contrast, mon-
opolies are companies that successfully intern-
alise the benefits of increasing returns. What 
happens in leading technology clusters today is 
this: the external returns of the clusters interact 
with the internalised increasing returns of 
companies with market power; each amplifies 
the other.
Specialised concentrations of innova-
tive firms—iconic places such as California’s 
Silicon Valley or the Route 128 halo around 
Figure 3. Change in ratio of market capitalisation to book value of assets, 1980 to 2016. Shown are all commuting zones for 
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Boston—are often understood entirely in 
terms of agglomeration economies: as virtuous 
circles in which localised rivalry and partner-
ship between firms generate skills and innov-
ation, raising productivity, wages and profits 
and making products that increase social wel-
fare. Marshall gave three reasons for firms to 
co-locate in such clusters: proximity to a pool 
of skilled labour, knowledge spillovers (‘in the 
air’) and value chain proximity—specialised 
suppliers and customers (Marshall, 1890). 
From the 1970s onward, neo-Marshallian work 
has brought into this picture local public in-
stitutions; universities; trade associations, 
consortia and other manifestations of formal 
inter-firm cooperation; social networks as fa-
cilitators of trust, reduced transaction costs 
and knowledge sharing; government R&D 
spending; and knowledge-seeking multi-
national corporations.2
A theme through much of this research—
and underlying the policies that emanate from 
these ideas—has been that agglomeration 
economies raise both the static and dynamic in-
novative productivity of relatively small firms, 
to the extent that a resource-rich agglomer-
ation is often seen as a place where small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entre-
preneurial newcomers can compete with es-
tablished giants. This view began with studies 
of intermediate technology industries in Italy 
and Germany (for example, Becattini, 1989; 
Schmitz, 1992), but was quickly extended to the 
Silicon Valley in Saxenian’s (1994) classic study, 
in which the apparently free flow of knowledge 
in that cluster was contrasted with the secretive, 
vertically integrated environs of Boston. This 
impression that clusters are gardens of SMEs 
persists despite plentiful evidence on the 
key role of large firms—Feldman calls them 
‘anchor tenants’ —in clusters (Best, 2001; 
Feldman, 2003; Klepper, 2011); arguments that 
the SME-based industrial district is not a stable 
configuration, drifting over time towards large 
firm dominance (Farrell and Knight, 2003; 
Harrison, 1997); often symbiotic relationships 
between multinational corporations and clus-
ters (Belussi and Sammarra, 2009); and the fact 
that the Silicon Valley was created as much by 
venture capitalists and intellectual property 
lawyers in the search for new business models 
as by the free flow of engineering knowledge 
(Kenney and Florida, 2000; Suchman, 2000). 
And yet, this literature addresses problems of 
power relationships between large and small 
firms within clusters but is silent on any pos-
sible relationship between clusters competing in 
the same industry.
Monopoly—and just as much, the pros-
pect of creating a new monopoly—amplifies 
Marshallian external economies by increasing 
the value of skilled labour, of knowledge spill-
overs and of supplier proximity; it also cre-
ates a considerable value in the proximity to 
a market for both financing and acquiring 
start-up companies. Autor et al’.s (2020) super-
star nomenclature is borrowed from a theory 
about superstar pay for individual performance 
(Rosen, 1981; Sattinger, 1979) and is applicable 
to superstar firms: in the winner-takes-all world 
of information-based monopolies, the value 
of technical or managerial staff who are even 
slightly better, and of technical and market in-
telligence that is even slightly more complete or 
up to date, might make the difference between 
market dominance and irrelevance (Frank and 
Cook, 1995). The most productive resources are 
found in the place that dominates an industry, 
creating reinforcing feedback that amplifies dif-
ferences between places.
Skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is 
typically used to explain the growing gap be-
tween the wages of workers. The hypothesis is 
that new technologies have raised the demand 
for skilled labour, relative to unskilled labour, 
faster than the relative supply of skilled labour 
has grown (Goldin and Katz, 2008; a good ex-
ample of the application of this theory to the 
disparity between wages in tech clusters and 
wages in other places can be seen in Moretti, 
2012). Setting aside the various shortcomings of 
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inequality,3 we simply note that market power 
is not the same as technology. Market power in 
the technology sector, with its winner-takes-all 
dynamics, raises the marginal revenue product 
of the best-skilled labour. SBTC may also be a 
factor, but we should not mistake high wages 
paid to optimise rent-seeking in a technologic-
ally dynamic winner-takes-all market, for evi-
dence of SBTC.4,5
In technology sectors today, an additional 
benefit to location within a major cluster is 
found in finance and in the related market for 
corporate control.6 The ecology of start-ups 
and their growth, or successful exit through 
initial public offering (IPO) or acquisition, re-
wards proximity both to venture capitalists 
and to large firms in related segments (Kenney, 
2011; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). The firms 
that get preferential treatment are called high-
growth start-ups and are in industries where a 
new product or business model is scalable, with 
the potential to dominate particular market 
segments (for example, Zeller, 2007). For both 
founders and investors, then, high-growth start-
ups are speculations on potential monopoly. 
Venture capitalists and start-ups thus have 
a mutual interest in locating in large tech ag-
glomerations and in the city regions that host 
them. This has reinforced relationships of spa-
tial dominance and dependence—or territorial 
hierarchies—between monopoly-based clus-
ters and areas relying on competitive industries 
in the USA (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 
Feldman and Florida, 1994; Susman and Schutz, 
1983). In Europe, there is more variation, which 
reflects the patterns of spatial organisation of 
industrial production and capital markets dif-
ferences across countries (Klagge and Martin, 
2005; Martin et al., 2002, 2005).
Large firms, too, share in the benefits of 
co-location with start-ups and venture capital. 
While a few start-ups grow large, most either 
fail or are acquired by larger firms; being ac-
quired on favourable terms is the principal 
business objective for many founders and the 
venture capitalists. A  strategy of the larger 
firms, such as Apple, Google and Facebook, 
is to either acquire their younger competitors 
or kill them. Proximity mutually benefits the 
strategies of both the large incumbents and the 
high-growth start-ups.
Monopoly thus increases the gravitational 
pull of agglomeration economies: both the 
established monopolies and startups—the 
would-be monopolies—prefer to locate there. 
People in other places make plans to find their 
own tech niche, with the aim of growing into a 
new Silicon Valley, but they have faint hope for 
realising returns on their investments.
What harm does a monopoly do?
There are three sets of reasons we should 
worry about the increase in monopoly power. 
First, there is the polarisation of income within 
the wealthy and growing technology clusters. 
People living in these places who are not the 
beneficiaries of high tech-driven incomes can 
no longer afford homes and witness a decline in 
their living standards. Second, monopoly power 
has a general deleterious effect on society due 
to the distributional impacts of monopoly rents 
that result in higher prices and lower innov-
ation. Third, there are specific distribution ef-
fects on places outside the tech- (and, as we 
shall see, finance- and government-) clusters: 
places sometimes called “left behind” but, we 
will argue, could better be described as “held 
back”.
Basic theories of city growth tell us that 
big cities have higher costs, due to conges-
tion (Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998). Big cities 
also enjoy higher productivity of labor, for 
reasons we know from Marshall (1890) and 
Jacobs (1961): sharing the services of specialist 
workers and firms, and lumpy infrastructure; 
improved matching of workers with jobs; better 
learning due to spillovers, rivalry, and again the 
proximity to a diverse collection of specialists 
(Duranton and Puga, 2004). As long as prod-
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For the purposes of determining urban scale, 
as for determining wages, when we say ‘prod-
uctivity’ we mean ‘marginal revenue product’. 
The high productivity and high pay in cities that 
are bases from which market power is exercised 
mean that the city can grow even larger before 
congestion costs choke off growth: one reason 
cities grow big is that they are centres of power 
(Sassen, 1991; Walker, 2016).
Many workers, however, are no more pro-
ductive in a large city than in a small one. 
Kemeny and Osman (2018) find that, in the 
USA, following the growth of tech employ-
ment, wages in non-tradeable services affected 
by secondary local job creation rose only very 
slightly in real terms. Lee and Clarke (2019), in 
a similar study of the UK, find that following 
the growth of tech employment, wages in non-
tradeable services affected by secondary local 
job creation actually fell in real terms. Both 
results imply a sharp rise in local income in-
equality, consistent with Hudson’s (2006) 
finding, for the UK, that the share of informa-
tion economy employment in a city is closely 
related to income inequality (in contrast, prod-
uctivity growth in manufacturing both raises 
local average incomes and reduces local in-
equality: see Hornbek and Moretti, 2019). The 
upshot, in the wealthy technology clusters, 
is housing crisis and growing homelessness 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2019).
Our second question concerned the damage 
from information-based monopolies in general. 
This is a complicated picture. The pharmaceut-
ical company, exploiting a limited-term mon-
opoly on a particular drug, harms consumers 
through monopoly pricing just as described in 
textbooks. Google and Facebook, on the other 
hand, provide services free to consumers. Who 
is harmed? These companies make money by 
selling advertising, a business they can dom-
inate because they have access to a huge 
number of customers and because they have 
unparalleled information about those cus-
tomers. The advertising cost is absorbed invis-
ibly into prices consumers pay, with an overall 
effect that is difficult to measure, though the 
effective duopoly on Web advertising presum-
ably raises price. The more obvious damage is 
to competing advertisers, such as newspapers 
(Fox, 2019), and the effective abandonment of 
local news reporting (Jennings and Rubado, 
2019). Where Google and Facebook (and be-
fore them, Craigslist) destroy newspapers, 
Amazon exploits its control of both supplier 
and customer information to optimise its own 
prices and product lines, at the expense of the 
independent suppliers. Since the adoption of 
Bork’s (1967) doctrine, damage to suppliers is 
not seen as an anti-trust problem by US courts. 
The damage to consumers, the new standard 
for regulation, is more difficult to discern: the 
fundamental problem of determining con-
sumer harm is to know the counterfactual—
what the alternative is. Today we deal with 
electronic networks, but networks are as old 
as humanity, as old as marketplaces and trade 
routes; trading systems often have “natural” 
choke points, at which princes or corporations 
will attempt to convert gains from trade into 
rents. Every marketplace, or trade route, offers 
consumer benefit and can be taxed whether by 
the state, by gangsters and pirates or by cor-
porations; even with the tax, consumers are 
likely to be better off with the marketplace 
or trade route. The question is not whether it 
should exist, but whether there is a better way 
to govern it.
In Microsoft’s Office, we see a network that 
joins customer to customer. It is often thought 
that Microsoft owes its continued dominance 
to intellectual property protection, but this 
is so only in the most trivial sense: what links 
customers is not the complex code that makes 
Microsoft’s products run nor is it the user inter-
face so important to your experience at the 
keyboard or lectern: it is the small but stra-
tegically crucial matter of the specifications for 
the formats in which documents are saved. For 
several years in the 1990s and 2000s, Microsoft 
fought regulatory battles around the world to 
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be saved in standard and non-proprietary for-
mats; their victory in those battles is the basis 
of their monopoly.
The network products of both Amazon-type 
platforms and Microsoft’s general-purpose 
software are a particular type of information 
product, which is to say products based on 
replicable code, so that marginal production 
cost is very low. Some forms of digitised en-
tertainment—movies and music—are infor-
mation products but not network products, 
because their network properties—the inter-
face standards they use—are open. We can, in 
a more general sense, talk of the information 
content of a product—the share of its produc-
tion cost that is the fixed cost of creating the 
replicable code; pharmaceuticals, genetically 
modified organisms and commodity micro-
chips are all products with high information 
content. Companies selling information prod-
ucts typically rely on intellectual property (IP) 
protection.
In all these cases—information products 
generally and digitally enabled networks, plat-
forms—extreme increasing returns are often 
understood as creating a natural monopoly. 
These increasing returns, however, depend 
also on institutional arrangements that favour 
monopoly (Guy, 2007). Khan (2017) notes that 
earlier generations of network monopoly, such 
as railroads, were required to act as common car-
riers, neither competing with nor discriminating 
between shippers, and that the principle could 
also be applicable to Amazon. The strength—
breadth, duration and associated entitle-
ments—of intellectual property rights is always 
contested: while much of Disney’s oeuvre 
is borrowed from the Brothers Grimm and 
others, its own copyright on Mickey Mouse is 
seemingly immortal (Lessig, 2004); rights to the 
use of genetically-modified seeds are now en-
forced strikingly in favour of the rights holders, 
but a good case can be made for treating them 
as de facto essential standards, and thus subject 
to reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) 
licensing (Vacca et al., 2014).
In addition to the harm monopoly control of 
a market brings to individual consumers and 
businesses, monopoly exacerbates inequality of 
income (Khan and Vaheesan, 2016) and wealth 
(Commanor and Smiley, 1975). Eggertsson 
et al. (2018) find that, between 1980 and 2016, 
financial wealth increased rapidly despite no 
real increase in the amount of investment in the 
economy; the average rate of return on capital 
has stayed steady while interest rates have 
dropped. The financial value of many firms is 
now permanently higher than the cost of their 
assets, due to investment in intangibles, such 
as product differentiation, branding and ad-
vertising in order to maintain market share—a 
particular type of rent-seeking behaviour. 
Despite higher profits and lower interest rates, 
firms have perversely not invested in either 
their own operations or workforces (Lazonick, 
2014; Lazonick et al., 2013).
Now to the third problem: this economic de-
velopment model cannot be emulated by the 
places left behind. Indeed, agglomerations of 
information-based monopoly actively hold 
other places back in three ways: by appropri-
ating revenues that are effectively a tax on al-
most all business activities in most parts of the 
world; rent-seeking behaviour restricts the flow 
and use of basic knowledge, thus degrading 
capabilities; and the high-profit margins associ-
ated with monopolies absorb capital which has 
been bled from the left-behind places.
In the early twentieth century, innovation in 
electric power distribution and telecommuni-
cations created monopolies, and government 
intervened to regulate these new networks 
(Hughes, 1983; Wu, 2018). While today’s digital 
networks present some of the same issues, the 
geography of networks has changed, along with 
the locus of regulation and the impact of politics. 
When the network is a grid for the distribution 
of electric power, the geographical scope of the 
monopoly is approximately co-extensive with 
the monopoly’s physical assets and places of 
employment and may be regulated (or owned) 
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the twentieth century, a distinction was made 
in the USA between local and long-distance 
telephone services, which were regulated dif-
ferently—and the state regulatory bodies kept 
local calls very cheap. Today’s information-
based monopolies project market power over 
much wider—often global—territories; to their 
home bases, they represent valuable export in-
dustries, thus their home governments have 
little motivation to regulate them (Iammarino, 
2018).7
Information-based monopolies are col-
lecting rents—effectively taxes—based on the 
global distribution of their products just as 
ancient empires exacted tribute from distant 
provinces and returned it to their capitals. The 
apps on your phone may come from many sup-
pliers, but either Google or Apple is getting 
its cut, wherever you are. Farmers the world 
round pay Monsanto (now part of Bayer) 
for each seed they plant, using and re-using 
the same patented genetic code (Mitchell, 
2014). Booking intermediaries such as Airbnb, 
Trip Advisor, Booking.com and Expedia 
(Microsoft, again) take 15%–25% from the 
provision of lodging by hundreds of thousands 
of independent operators around the world. 
Companies that once bought advertising from 
local newspapers now buy it from Google or 
Facebook, which may, in turn, distribute it 
through the online version of that same news-
paper, but having again taken a generous fee: 
in 2017, 61% of Web advertising revenues glo-
bally, and 25% of all media advertising rev-
enues, went to Google or Facebook (WARC, 
2017). In spatial terms, this redistributes 
wealth from around the world, to the share-
holders and employees of the information-
based monopolies—disproportionately found 
in a few privileged places.
The control of market entry exercised by 
monopolies affects us not only in our roles as 
customers or suppliers but also in our roles as 
potential producers. Computer software is the 
ubiquitous tool of the modern age; millions are 
urged to learn to code, and shortages of coders 
are proclaimed (Cappelli, 2014), but the bar-
riers to entry in the software market serve to 
discourage the use of programming skills. This 
includes both the barriers already discussed 
above, and the fact that the products of com-
panies such as Microsoft, Adobe, Apple and 
Oracle are relatively closed, inhibiting cus-
tomisation.8 In every town, every business and 
every government office, this limits the ability 
of technical staff to customise the software 
products they use. It is hard to overstate the 
implications: not only is adapting software to 
an organization’s own purposes locally based 
on skilled work, but it also develops a product 
and capabilities that can be sold to others. The 
mechanisms that ensure the continued mon-
opoly position of a company such as Microsoft 
concentrate the adaptation of software both 
organisationally and spatially (Raymond, 1998; 
Stallman, 1985).
The interaction of monopoly with insti-
tutions of education and research further 
limits access to knowledge and capabilities. 
Scientific knowledge is spatially concentrated 
(for example, Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 
Feldman and Florida, 1994). A decentralised 
university system has been a long source of 
American scientific leadership, with research 
universities located in every state. Previously, 
the best students in the heartland would attend 
local universities. Increased income inequality 
and the concentration of highly paid jobs in 
particular regions have combined to draw the 
best students towards a more selected group 
of universities, disproportionately located in 
or near the technology, finance and govern-
ment clusters on the coasts (for the UK, see 
Faggian and McCann, 2009; for the USA, see 
Fallah et al., 2013). A particular strain of plat-
form monopoly enlarges this gulf: commercial 
academic publishers use the power of their 
platforms to exact high prices for journals, 
putting the latest research results beyond the 
means of small, poor or remote colleges and 
universities (to say nothing of independent 
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that can afford comprehensive access to re-
cently published scientific research are thus 
disproportionately in the same technology or 
financial centres as the monopoly companies: 
such spatial coincidence characterises many 
global cities such as New York or London 
(for example, Beaverstock and Smith, 1996). 
Due to the decentralised nature of univer-
sity research, there remains commercialisa-
tion activity and venture capital investments 
in some high-growth startups in university 
towns around the USA but still, 40 years since 
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, there has been 
limited job growth and widespread prosperity 
as a result of these efforts.9 The geographical 
concentration of research further disadvan-
tages companies that are not located near a 
leading technology-university cluster: D’Este 
et  al. (2013) show for the UK that firms lo-
cated outside of such clusters actually depend 
more on nearby universities when they form 
research links.
And, finally, finance: growing monopolies, and 
start-ups that are prospective monopolies, rep-
resent investments with high expected returns; 
the financial sector facilitates the movement of 
capital out of firms with lower returns (that is, 
firms operating in more competitive markets) 
and into firms with monopoly power or mon-
opoly prospects. Many platform companies 
continue absorbing large amounts of capital 
long after the start-up phase. Opportunities for 
investment in monopolies and potential mon-
opolies bleed capital out of places that have 
relatively weak monopoly presence. Capital, 
however, does not always move easily. In the 
period since 1980, financial sector actors, such 
as banks and private equity, have enjoyed great 
enhancements to their ability to extract re-
sources out of firms that do not have monopoly 
prospects and to channel it to ones that do. 
How this comes about is tied up with liberalisa-
tion of the financial sector, which has occurred 
in parallel with the relaxation of anti-trust rules 
and with the deregulation of industry. We pro-
vide detail in the next section.
Finance: feeding monopoly, holding 
others back
As recently as the 1970s, the typical medium or 
large American firm was largely self-financing: 
it paid a bit of its cash flow out to shareholders 
as dividends and used the rest for capital ex-
penditure. Most of the capital expenditure 
was financed internally and high levels of bor-
rowing or new issues of stock were rare. When 
a firm’s cash flow and capital expenditures 
were in balance, financial sector actors—
banks, minority shareholders and so on—had 
little influence over how a firm conducted its 
business.
Today, the typical publicly held firm pays out 
substantially more of its cash, whether in divi-
dends to its shareholders or for acquisitions of 
other firms. Also, again compared with the 1970s 
and 1980s, it is far more likely that a firm will 
either require substantial new financing for its 
capital expenditure or devote only a small frac-
tion of the cash it generates from operations to 
capital expenditure. The result is greater inter-
actions with financial market. Before we say 
more, let us first take some measurements.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we de-
fine the imbalance between a firm’s cash flow 
and capital expenditure as financial dependence 
(FD), the absolute value of:
(Capital expenditure − cash from operations)/
Capital expenditure
 (1)
In other words, large positive or negative values 
of (1) indicate engagement with—dependence 
on—the financial sector. When the numerator 
of (1) is positive, the firm’s capital expenditure 
exceeds its cash flow from operations; unless it 
has accumulated liquid assets in earlier years, 
the firm must obtain additional funds from the 
financial sector. When the numerator is nega-
tive, the firm is generating cash in excess of its 
capital expenditure; this again brings it into en-
gagement with the financial sector, as the firm 
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in the form of dividends, invests in financial as-
sets or acquires other firms.
In Figure  4, we examine the 3000 largest 
non-financial firms, as defined by sales, in the 
Compustat database in each year from 1971 
to 2018. We rank these firms by FD. In the 
first panel, we plot, for each year, three points 
from the distribution—the 20th, 50th and 80th 
percentiles in the distribution of firms. In the 
second panel, we plot FD for the firms at the 
90th and 10th percentiles—these more extreme 
percentiles are graphed separately for reasons 
of scale.
We see in the first panel of Figure  4 that, 
prior to the year 2000, the median firm in this 
sample was self-financing, with modest payouts 
of less than its capital expenditure. Between 
2000 and 2002, payouts from the median firm 
rose. From 2000 onwards, but with a surge in 
2009, following the financial crisis, payouts are 
approximately equal to capital expenditure 
(FD ≈ −1).
Even more striking is the increased disper-
sion of FD among firms, the rise of FD (posi-
tive or negative) in the tails of the distribution. 
Before 2000, the firm at the 20th percentile of 
FD had cash flow of three times its capital ex-
penditure (FD = −2); from 2002 onwards that 
figure is five times (FD = −4). Looking to posi-
tive values (capital expenditure > cash flow) of 
FD for the 80th percentile of the distribution, 
the change is less dramatic and more obviously 
affected by movements in financial markets (the 
burst of the dot com bubble in 2000–2001; the 
financial crisis of 2008), but the trend is upward. 
This picture is confirmed when we look further 
out in the tails (10th and 90th percentiles).
Where this aggregate outflow goes is of course 
a question: it might be, for instance, to firms not 
in this sample because they are privately held 
or foreign. Alternatively, the outflow may go to 
consumption by shareholders. We cannot know 
that from this sample. The point to bear in 
mind is that greater dispersion of FD, positive 
and negative, means a larger role for the finan-
cial sector. Because positive and negative FD 
are different, there is no reason to expect posi-
tive and negative values to be symmetrical in 
terms of their impact on firms. Nonetheless, the 
growing departure from self-financing (FD = 0) 
is usefully illustrated by plotting the median of 
absolute values of FD for each year (Figure 5).
Normative financial economics has regarded 
the rise of FD as a good thing. To understand 
the connection between finance, monopoly and 
disinvestment from the left-behind places, it 
helps to start from the arguments in its favour. 
Increased FD is taken as an indicator of the in-
creased efficiency of financial markets, better 
fulfilling their role of enhancing the overall 
economic efficiency by moving the capital from 
less productive to more productive uses (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998).
This constructive role for FD can be conceptu-
alised in two distinct, but complementary, ways; 
we will call them financial development and 
agency, respectively. The financial development 
view is that FD increases when capital markets 
become more efficient. We assume that the firm is 
profit-maximising; improved efficiency of finan-
cial markets lowers the barriers to the firm’s use 
of the financial sector either to increase capital in-
vestment or, in the absence of profitable internal 
opportunities, to redirect free cash flow (that is, 
any cash or assets that can be converted to cash 
to get a higher return elsewhere) to financial mar-
kets and thus to fund investment elsewhere.
The agency view sees a conflict between 
the interests of the firm’s insiders (in the sim-
plest version, managers) and external finan-
cial claimants (shareholders and creditors). 
Insiders want to keep resources in the firm, to 
make it grow, so they pay out as little as they 
can without inviting the intervention of out-
siders; they also want to maintain their control 
of the firm, so they do not take on too much 
new financing, as that would empower the out-
siders who were providing the new capital. In 
the agency view, then, the self-financing firm 
was a managerial firm (Baumol, 1959; Berle 
and Means, 1932; Marris, 1963; Penrose, 1959), 
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1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Manne, 1965). 
In the agency view, increased engagement with 
financial markets indicates that the power of 
outsiders, and their ability to monitor corporate 
managers and to enforce the payout of free cash 
flow has grown.
Market power is absent from both the finan-
cial development and the agency views as typic-
ally formulated: the proposition that efficiency 
is enhanced by firms to disgorging free cash 
flow (whether in profit-maximising duty or due 
to the vigilance of outsiders) assumes that the 
higher returns available elsewhere are higher 
because the capital is actually more productive 
in the alternative use. The implicit model is a 
competitive market without market power, but 
with variations in the profitability of firms due 
to differences in managerial practice, industry 
life cycle or simple random bad luck. If the 
higher returns are instead found by investing 
in actual or prospective monopolies, then the 
mechanism describes not an efficient allocation 
of capital, but the stripping of assets from firms 
which may be perfectly viable—in the sense 
that they can achieve normal economic profits 
in competitive markets—in order to finance 
rent-seeking.
In line with the prescriptions of these the-
ories, reforms between the late 1970s and 
the early 2000s in banking, securities regu-
lation, pensions and corporate govern-
ance increased the influence of the financial 
sector over non-financial firms. In addition 
to the claims of economic efficiency, these 
changes acquired the political rationale of 
defending the rights of minority shareholders, 
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Figure 5. Median absolute value of FD statistic. Source: authors’ calculation from Compustat data.
a constituency greatly expanded by pension 
reforms which shifted the retirement savings 
of millions into the stock market (Gourevitch 
and Shinn, 2005; O’Sullivan, 2001). Enhanced 
shareholder rights together with new liquidity 
in financial markets—thanks in part to the 
pension reforms, and later the 1999 repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act—led to the growth of 
leveraged takeovers. As described and pre-
scribed by Jensen (1989), this practice has the 
explicit purpose of loading a firm up with debt 
so that its managers will be forced to pay out 
cash (their free cash flow), in the form of high 
fixed interest payments. The practices Jensen 
described have become the tools of the private 
equity trade.
For banking, it was a deliberate federal policy 
of deregulating banks, encouraging them to 
merge and take on greater risk (Blinder, 2013; 
Calabria, 2009), followed by the 2008 Banking 
Crisis where the largest “too-big-to-fail” banks 
were bailed out and have only subsequently be-
come larger. The regime of high financial depend-
ency or financialization that emerged is a situation 
in which finance is disconnected from the real 
economy (Corpataux et al., 2017; and other papers 
in Martin and Pollard, 2017), and alternatively one 
in which finance rules the real economy, with the 
interests of shareholders (or often, in practice, of fi-
nancial sector institutions) overriding the interests 
of all other stakeholders in a firm (Appelbaum 
and Batt, 2014; Lazonick, 2010).
Financialization can be faulted on various 
grounds, both of efficiency and of distribution. 
Our particular concerns here are its inter-
action with monopoly and the spatial conse-
quences of that interaction. Over 40 years ago, 
Harvey wrote that “The perpetual tendency 
to try to realize value without producing it 
is, in fact, the central contradiction of the fi-
nance form of capitalism. And the tangible 
manifestations of this central contradiction 
are writ large in the urban landscapes of the 
advanced capitalist nations”. (Harvey, 1974, 
254). With a spatially concentrated monopoly, 
the monopoly-driven reallocation of capital 
accentuates the inflow of capital to monopoly 
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invest and outflows from other firms and the 
places in which they are located—a process 
earlier described by Myrdal (1957). This, to-
gether with the effective tax imposed globally 
by the use of monopoly services, and the with-
holding of access to basic knowledge and tools, 
is the third obstacle posed by spatially concen-
trated monopoly to the growth or revival of 
the places that are not homes of monopoly or 
privileged parts of their networks.
In addition to its growing power in the 
affairs of firms, the US financial sector has be-
come more concentrated, with the five largest 
banks increasing their share of the commercial 
banking market from 29% in 1996 to 46% in 
2017. The consolidation of banking power has 
a geography as well: the reduction of financial 
resources for held-back places has been ag-
gravated by the growing industrial and spatial 
concentration of commercial banking: between 
1994 and 2018, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) for spatial concentration (by com-
muting zone) of US commercial banking grew 
from 0.0199 to 0.030 for deposits and from 
0.0497 to 0.1150 for assets (authors’ calculation 
from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) data). The location of bank headquar-
ters is even more spatially concentrated, while 
the headquarters of corporate finance are lo-
cated in a few global centres.
The wages of the good jobs in corporate fi-
nance have followed those in the non-financial 
monopoly sectors: Philippon and Reshef 
(2012) show that during post-war decades 
of tight financial regulation, financial sector 
workers earned less than engineers with 
comparable educations, while in the deregu-
lated (which is to say, financialized) market 
since 1980, they earn more (see also Levy and 
Temin, 2007). The financial sector siphons 
funds to the monopolists from places and 
firms that have been left behind, and it is paid 
well for its activities, maintaining metropol-
itan New York as a concentration of wealth 
alongside the Silicon Valley and other tech-
nology centres.
The relationship between monopoly and 
financialization is certainly correlated and dis-
cussions of causality are beyond our descriptive 
analysis. We do not know if monopoly power 
would have grown without financialization or 
if financialization is driven by the demand from 
growing or prospective monopolies. Certainly, 
both financialization and the growth of mon-
opoly are artefacts of the same neoliberal 
deregulation agenda. These are research ques-
tions that beg for further analysis and need 
incorporation in the economic geography re-
search agenda.
Implications and conclusions
In America, it is now common to speak of Red 
States and Blue States as if they were nat-
ural categories. This political division reflects 
stark economic realities: the technology clus-
ters of Silicon Valley, Seattle, Boston and San 
Diego; New York, the centre of finance; and 
Washington, where the rules that govern both 
monopoly and finance are determined; fortu-
nate technology or finance enclaves such as 
Austin or Charlotte—all these are doing well. 
Places that were doing well in the 1980 but have 
since lost ground have become known as the 
Red States, voting in ways that seem to run con-
trary to their economic interest but reflecting a 
deep dissatisfaction with the status quo.
This divide is not an inevitable outcome of 
agglomeration economies or market forces 
but reflects the rise of monopoly, financial 
power and rent seeking—forces the eco-
nomic geography literature seems to have 
forgotten. Rising populism and the revolt 
of places “that don’t matter” (Rodriguez-
Pose, 2018)—places, we have argued, that 
are held back—require new solutions. Local 
economic development policies that focus 
on generating increasing returns to place, 
finding the right industrial niche or smart 
specialisation and attracting established com-
panies or enabling entrepreneurs, have not 
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of the population. Current strategies will 
seldom be effective so long as spatial income 
disparities are cemented by monopoly power 
and monopoly power is bolstered by finan-
cial power. Through product market, labour 
market and financial channels, monopoly 
conditions drain the left-behind areas of re-
sources; the entry barriers erected by mon-
opolies limit entrepreneurial opportunities 
and often pull those firms that are able to 
succeed away from their original location to 
relocate to the centres of monopoly power. 
Incumbent giants and the search for new 
monopoly business models will continue to 
reinforce localised external increasing re-
turns to create superstar cities and clusters. 
Against these giants, it is difficult for other 
localities to claim any advantage.
The most urgent task for local economic 
development—and complementary to place-
based interventions—is, therefore, at the na-
tional level. Investments made in lagging 
places will not have the desired effects until 
the 40-year rise of monopoly power is reversed 
and the financial sector is regulated. Breaking 
monopoly power, however, proves to be tricky: 
many of these monopolies have become 
sources of comparative advantage for the USA, 
and their interests are now the focus of its trade 
policy (Rodrik, 2018). The non-financial mon-
opolies themselves are politically powerful, and 
their symbiotic relationship with the financial 
sector gives Wall Street and the monopolies a 
common interest in the status quo.
The joint power of monopoly and finance 
have been confronted in America in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. Efforts of US 
State Attorneys Generals—and of anti-trust 
authorities in Europe at national and European 
Commission levels—signal a realisation that 
platform business models are not a techno-
logical inevitability but are equally due to gov-
ernments’ failure to regulate the new networks 
adequately.
The degree to which a similar situation pre-
vails in other countries outside the USA is 
not clear. While De Loecker and Eeckhout 
(2018) do find rising market power over the 
same period in OECD countries, the USA has 
a unique concentration of tech-monopolies. 
The role of the financial sector differs greatly 
between countries and among the varieties of 
capitalistic systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001), as 
does the spatial concentration of good jobs. Yet 
many other countries emulate the US model, 
and the extent to which multinational corpor-
ations are replicating the US pattern globally 
still need be accurately measured. Trends indi-
cate that this may indeed be the case.
Our future agenda is to empirically model 
some of the relations we describe in this paper. 
There is great opportunity to provide theory, 
empirical work and policy recommendations 
to address regional disparities and income in-
equalities. We hope others will join in the study 
of finance and market structure as a topic of 
economic geography inquiry.
Endnotes
1 We use “monopoly power” interchangeably with the 
more general “market power”. This is partly on the fa-
miliar grounds that no monopoly is absolute—there 
is some substitute for almost anything one can buy, at 
some price. Moreover, for many of the cases, we are 
interested in, a model of oligopoly is not appropriate—
Google is not a member of an internet search oligopoly, 
it is a monopoly within its (very considerable) niche.
2 See, among many others, Asheim and Coenen 
(2005), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Bathelt and 
Li (2013), Bathelt et al. (2004), Best (1990), Breschi 
and Malerba (2005), Cooke (2001), Feldman (2003), 
Feldman and Florida (1994), Giuliani (2007), Giuliani 
and Bell (2005), Gordon and McCann (2000), Hirst 
and Zeitlin (1991), Iammarino and McCann (2006, 
2013), Kamnungwut and Guy (2012), Kitagawa 
(2004), Markusen (1996), Martin and Sunley (2011), 
Maskell (2001), Morgan (2004), Piore and Sabel 
(1984), Porter (1998), Pyke et al. (1990), Steiner and 
Hartmann (2006), Storper (2013) and Uyarra (2010).
3 SBTC has never been a complete explanation 
for changes in the distribution of earnings: there is 
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in the demand for skill due to globalisation (Autor 
et al., 2015; Ebenstein et al., 2009; Houseman, 2007); 
for the effect of institutional changes, such as those 
in the minimum wage, tax rates, regulation of in-
dustries and the rights of unions (Atkinson, 2000; 
DiNardo et al., 1996); and for power-biased techno-
logical change, due to the role of new technologies in 
the surveillance of workers and the planning of work 
(Guy and Skott, 2008; Skott and Guy, 2007).
4 Some of the best evidence for the effect of market 
structure, rather than SBTC, in the determination of high 
wages comes from the financial sector. Philippon and 
Reshef (2012) show that prior to financial deregulation, 
workers in corporate finance were paid less than engin-
eers with comparable levels of education; following de-
regulation, the workers in finance were paid more. They 
document this relationship between deregulation and 
the relative pay of financial sector workers from before 
the Wall Street crash of 1929, up to the 2000s.
5 Note too that if locating a firm—or the headquar-
ters and advanced technological operations of a 
firm—within a cluster gives access to the best-skilled 
labour, it is at the cost not only of the premium for 
the cluster location and cluster wages but also of for-
going the benefits of labour market monopsony that 
could be realised by locating outside such a cluster. 
Azar et al. (2018) show that, in 2016, a majority of 
US local labour markets could be defined as highly 
concentrated, with a few employers dominating local 
demand for workers. This employer concentration 
dampens wage growth (Benmelech et al., 2018). The 
increased control of employers over wages is accen-
tuated by low and declining national rates of union-
isation, regulation of labour market by states and/
or localities and the fact that places can engage in a 
“race to the bottom” in terms of labour standards so 
as to attract inward investment (Feldman, 1994; 2003; 
Peck, 2001).
6 The value of locating in a cluster in order to par-
ticipate in the acquisitions market contrasts with 
Klepper’s (2011) account of the origin of clusters—
including the Silicon Valley—in which a large role 
is played by established firms inadvertently seeding 
new firms, sometimes the simple result of disagree-
ments within the established firm. These stories are 
not, of course, mutually exclusive.
7 We focus in this paper on information-based mon-
opoly, because of its clear association with tech-
nology clusters. The goods and services sold by these 
monopolies can be classified as tradeable—they are 
sold largely outside of the company’s home base 
and can be counted as an export product. When we 
consider the relationship between monopoly and 
left-behind places, however, we should not ignore 
monopolisation of non-tradeable services. Here, 
the companies involved are not ICT companies, but 
other service companies using ICT to achieve econ-
omies of scale. Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2019) 
decompose changes in the concentration of US 
industries between 1977 and 2017. They find no in-
crease in concentration in manufacturing and little 
in utilities but large rises in concentration in retail 
and wholesale trade and other services. The growth 
of large retail and service firms is almost entirely due 
to their expansion into new geographical markets. 
Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg argue that this growth 
was made possible by the adoption of new ICTs, 
facilitating management control over a large number 
of dispersed establishments. The growth of chain 
restaurants and the dominance of retailers, such as 
Wal-Mart and CVS, provide examples of this cor-
porate domination of local markets in non-tradeable 
services.
8 Ironically, the tech giants themselves depend 
heavily on open-source software; when they use it 
in consumer products—as in Google’s Android or 
Apple’s IoS built on Linux and BSD Unix, respect-
ively—the strategy, always, is to lock them down to 
keep control of the market. 
9 Perversely, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 has the ef-
fect of financializing new discoveries and increasing 
competition among universities (Eisenberg and 
Cook-Deegan, 2018).
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